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I. INTRODUCTION 
Berle and Means altered the direction of debate on corporate gov-
ernance by presenting evidence to suggest the owners of corporations did 
not in fact control their corporations.1 In Berle and Means’s view, the 
shareholders were too dispersed and uncoordinated to effectively exer-
cise control so that power devolved to the non-owner agents charged 
with managing the firm. 
An important implication of Berle and Means’s book is that the 
states could not be trusted to continue to regulate corporate governance. 
If managers control their corporations, then they also effectively choose 
the law that regulates corporate governance because the law of the state 
where the firm chooses to incorporate governs the relationship between 
the managers, the shareholders, and the corporation.2 It is not surprising 
that Berle and Means’s work influenced the development of New Deal 
legislation,3 including the Federal Securities Act of 19334 and the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934,5 the first federal laws regulating corporate 
governance. Stigler and Friedland note that “Samuel Rayburn, chairman 
of the House Commerce Committee, presented the 1933 bill in language 
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 1. See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932). 
 2. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, §§ 304, 307 (1971). 
 3. See generally William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s Corporat-
ist Origins: Adolf Berle and the ‘Modern Corporation,’ 34 J. CORP. L. 99 (2008) (discussing the 
influence of Adolf Berle, as well as Berle and Means’s book, on New Deal legislation generally). 
 4. Federal Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a−77z, 77aa. 
 5. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a−78z, 78aa−78pp. 
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that could have been, and in a sense was, provided by Berle and 
Means.”6 
Where the stock is widely distributed, as in the case of so many 
American corporations, the officials of the company, through the 
use of proxies and the advantage they have in obtaining proxies, are 
able to continue in office without much regard to their efficien-
cy . . . . Two hundred companies own 75 percent of the total wealth 
of the United States. 
The management of these big corporations, as a rule, own an insig-
nificant percentage of the outstanding voting stocks.7 
The link between Berle and Means and the distrust of state law is 
also evident in Justice Louis Brandeis’s famous 1933 dissent in Louis K. 
Liggett Co. v. Lee: 
The typical business corporation of the last century, owned by a 
small group of individuals, managed by their owners, and limited in 
size by their personal wealth, is being supplanted by huge concerns 
in which the lives of tens or hundreds of thousands of employees 
and the property of tens or hundreds of thousands of investors are 
subjected, through the corporate mechanism, to the control of a few 
men. Ownership has been separated from control; and this separa-
tion has removed many of the checks which formerly operated to 
curb the misuse of wealth and power . . . . Such is the Frankenstein 
monster which states have created by their corporation laws.8 
These ideas have retained a powerful hold on the popular and scholarly 
imagination. More than forty years after Berle and Means, William Cary 
denounced U.S. corporate law as a race to the bottom, with Delaware as 
the “bottom,” where managers could use their power over the demand 
side of the market to determine the nature of the law supplied by the 
leading incorporation jurisdiction.9 Cary’s assertion that Delaware could 
win incorporation business by attracting selfish managers and ignoring 
shareholders has provided a powerful basis for federalization of corpo-
rate law. 
                                                 
 6. See George J. Stigler & Claire Friedland, The Literature of Economics: The Case of Berle & 
Means, 26 J.L. & ECON. 237, 243 (1983). They also note, however, “the presumption is that the book 
was at most a most minor influence on the formulation and passage of the security acts.” Id. 
 7. Id. (citing 4 THE ECONOMIC REGULATION OF BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY 2615–16 (Bernard 
Schwartz ed., 1973)). They also note that the “two hundred corporations language,” contained in 
Berle and Means’s book, reappeared in President Roosevelt’s letter to Rayburn asking for the Secu-
rities Exchange Act of 1934. Id. 
 8. Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 564–67 (1933) (footnotes omitted). 
 9. See William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE 
L.J. 663 (1974). 
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In the eighty years since the publication of Berle and Means’s book, 
other ideas have risen to challenge its assumptions. Although the logic 
that the dispersed many are weaker than the concentrated few may seem 
compelling, the logic breaks down when one considers the market forces 
that discipline corporate governance.10 Corporate executives have noth-
ing to manage unless their firms can attract investments in highly com-
petitive capital markets. Investors who are at the mercy of corporate 
managers will demand a discount to reflect potential cheating. It follows 
that the firms that can best protect their owners from cheating can raise 
money at the lowest cost.11 In other words, managers must pay investors 
for permission to cheat them. Investors can determine the likelihood of 
cheating from firms’ disclosures about their managers and business. If 
investors cannot trust firms’ disclosures, they will charge an additional 
discount to reflect the risks imposed by poor information.12 In short, effi-
cient securities markets discipline managers. 
This logic extends to state law. Even if managers can choose the 
governing state, they will pay a price for choosing a law that ignores 
shareholders’ interests.13 Contrary to the assumption that Delaware is the 
“bottom” in the competition for corporate law, evidence developed in 
connection with the competing corporate finance thesis shows that inves-
tors actually pay more for firms that are incorporated in Delaware.14 
Many scholars continue to share Cary’s skepticism that Delaware’s 
dominance of the national market for corporate law15 indicates the exist-
                                                 
 10. See, e.g., ROBERTA ROMANO, THE ADVANTAGE OF COMPETITIVE FEDERALISM FOR 
SECURITIES REGULATION 45–46 (2002); Henry G. Manne, Current Views on the “Modern Corpora-
tion,” 38 U. DET. L.J. 559, 583 (1961). 
 11. See ROMANO, supra note 10, at 46. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corpora-
tion, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977). 
 14. There is evidence that the stock market rewards firms that reincorporate in Delaware from 
another jurisdiction. See ROMANO, supra note 10, at 64–75 (summarizing the results of empirical 
studies examining stock price reaction to firms’ decision to reincorporate as “compelling evidence 
that competition for corporate charters benefits investors”); Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law 
Improve Firm Value?, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 525, 525 (2001) (noting Delaware firms had higher “Tobin’s 
Q’s” than non-Delaware firms between 1981 and 1996); Peter Dodd & Richard Leftwich, The Mar-
ket for Corporate Charters: “Unhealthy Competition” Versus Federal Regulation, 53 J. BUS. 259 
(1980) (noting firms earned positive stock market returns from reincorporating in Delaware). 
 15. The market for corporate law is now generally understood to consist of a “local” market in 
which about half of publicly held firms choose their home state over Delaware and a “national” 
market for out-of-state corporations that Delaware dominates. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., Does 
the Evidence Favor State Competition in Corporate Law?, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1775 (2002) (noting 
Delaware has a 58% overall share of publicly traded nonfinancial firms); Robert Daines, The Incor-
poration Choices of IPO Firms, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1559, 1566 (2002) (noting about half of Fortune 
500 firms choose Delaware). 
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ence of a healthy competition for corporate law.16 A leading explanation 
that Delaware’s dominance is not evidence of a race to the top is based 
on the hypothesis that the market for incorporations is least effective in 
disciplining law that protects managers from threats to their control.17 
This theory suggests that Delaware wins the state competition by provid-
ing takeover protection. Another leading theory suggests Delaware caters 
to lawyers who constitute a powerful Delaware interest group responsi-
ble for crafting corporate law.18 There is also concern that Delaware’s 
competitive edge, derived from its sophisticated legal infrastructure of 
courts and lawyers,19 precludes effective competition. Even if the state 
competition for corporate law does not produce optimal corporate law, 
however, a question remains as to whether a monolithic and cumbersome 
federal system could provide a sufficient improvement to justify displac-
ing the current system. 
This brief overview of the corporate federalism debate provides the 
backdrop for analyzing recent papers on Nevada corporation law as the 
first viable alternative to Delaware in the national market for out-of-state 
incorporations.20 These papers argue that Nevada’s recent moves to im-
pose lax director fiduciary duties and become a low-liability haven for 
managers present a competitive threat to Delaware to which the latter 
state may not be able to respond effectively. Evidence that Nevada-
incorporated firms have a higher rate of issuing accounting restatements 
seems to support the conclusion that Nevada is attracting managers of 
firms with lax governance.21 This theory and evidence could renew con-
cern about a potential race to the bottom. 
We suggest an alternative version of what is happening in Nevada. 
Instead of managers racing their firms to Nevada to take advantage of lax 
fiduciary duties that make it easier for them to cheat, firms may be going 
                                                 
 16. See Michael Klausner, The Contractarian Theory of Corporate Law: A Generation Later, 
31 J. CORP. L. 779, 786–89 (2006) (reviewing the literature). 
 17. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms’ Decisions Where to Incorporate, 46 J.L. & 
ECON. 383, 405−06 (2003). 
 18. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware 
Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469, 503−04 (1987). 
 19. See Roberta Romano, Law as Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 225 (1985). This explanation appears to be robust as to business form in light of 
evidence of Delaware’s ability to dominate the competition for large limited liability companies. See 
Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Delaware for Small Fry: Jurisdictional Competition for 
Limited Liability Companies, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 91, 101. 
 20. See Michal Barzuza, Market Segmentation: The Rise of Nevada as a Liability-Free Juris-
diction, VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1920538; Michal 
Barzuza & David Smith, What Happens in Nevada? Self-Selecting into Lax Law (Va. Law & Econ. 
Research Paper No. 2011-08, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=1644974. 
 21. Barzuza & Smith, supra note 20. 
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to Nevada to reduce their costs of controlling cheating. Part of this strat-
egy is based on Nevada’s use of lower cost, bright-line rules for impos-
ing liability. Taking the costs of controlling cheating into account, Neva-
da law therefore actually may reduce rather than increase firms’ overall 
costs of delegating power to agents. Evidence concerning a higher rate of 
restatements by firms that incorporate in Nevada does not refute this al-
ternative story. Furthermore, the availability of relatively lax fiduciary 
duties in other jurisdictions, including Delaware, cast doubt on the race 
for suboptimal laxity as the primary explanation for Nevada’s success. 
In sum, the debate over Nevada essentially reduces to two accounts 
of Nevada’s role in the market for corporate law. One view is that Neva-
da law is racing to the bottom by enabling corporate managers to escape 
the discipline of fiduciary duties. Nevada thus can earn incorporation 
fees for its taxpayers by disregarding the interests of out-of-state share-
holders. Our alternative view is that Nevada provides a differentiated and 
lower cost alternative corporate law that better fits the needs of some 
firms and their shareholders. 
This theory and evidence highlight the need to exercise caution be-
fore concluding that evidence from Nevada implies legal intervention is 
warranted in the market for corporate law.22 This Article also suggests a 
broader response to continued assertions that the Berle−Means hypothe-
sis implies that strong federal law is necessary to deal with the separation 
of ownership and control. The general lesson is that before concluding 
that a significant federal regulatory expansion is necessary, it is im-
portant to consider carefully the reasons underlying firms’ choices and 
the effectiveness of market mechanisms for disciplining bad choices. 
Apart from Nevada’s implications for the federalization of corpo-
rate law, the appearance of a significant competitor to Delaware triggers 
reevaluation of state competition for corporate law and consideration of 
whether some legal reform might promote a broader and more efficient 
set of corporate laws. In particular, given the appearance of Nevada, it is 
worth asking why only Nevada, and why other states have not entered 
the marketplace for corporate law with their own differentiated statutes. 
The answer to this question may lie outside the box of state corporation 
law in alternative business forms23 and private lawmaking.24 
                                                 
 22. Note that our analysis is focused on corporate fiduciary duties. News stories also have 
alleged that Nevada is a haven for corporate shells promoted by purveyors of tax avoidance and asset 
protection devices. See, e.g., Brian Grow & Kelly Carr, Special Report: Nevada’s Big Bet on Secre-
cy, REUTERS, Sept. 26, 2011, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/26/us-shell-
games-nevada-idUSTRE78P1Y020110926. While these devices are indirectly relevant to this Arti-
cle insofar as they relate to Nevada’s general reputation and market niche, they are legally distinct 
from fiduciary duty provisions of corporate law. 
 23. LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION (2010). 
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The remainder of this Article is organized as follows. Part II pre-
sents the race-to-the-bottom view of Nevada law that is used to support 
federalizing corporate law. Part III discusses the alternative view of Ne-
vada’s role that raises doubts about whether Nevada is providing 
suboptimally lax law and the use of Nevada law as a basis for federaliza-
tion. Part IV examines the evidence on Nevada firms in light of the alter-
native hypotheses set out in Parts II and III. Part V discusses some lim-
ited evidence on the effect of Nevada reincorporation on shareholder 
value. Part VI concludes. 
II. RACE TO LAXITY 
Under the hypothesis that Nevada represents a race to the bottom, 
Nevada corporate law was revised to attract tax revenues by exploiting 
manager and shareholder agency costs created by the separation of own-
ership and control. Nevada’s significant participation in the national 
market for corporate law began in 2001 when Nevada changed its statu-
tory rules defining the fiduciary liability of Nevada corporation directors 
as part of a plan to significantly raise franchise taxes for Nevada corpora-
tions and to encourage corporations to pay the higher taxes.25 Under the 
2001 law, Nevada directors and officers have mandatory liability only 
for intentional misconduct and no other default or mandatory liability.26 
Nevada corporation law provides, in relevant part, “Directors and offic-
ers shall exercise their powers in good faith and with a view to the inter-
ests of the corporation.”27 Except as otherwise provided in the articles of 
incorporation or certain provisions of the corporation law, however, 
a director or officer is not individually liable to the corporation or 
its stockholders or creditors for any damages as a result of any act 
or failure to act in his capacity as a director or officer unless it is 
proven that: (a) His act or failure to act constituted a breach of his 
fiduciary duties as a director or officer; and (b) His breach of those 
duties involved intentional misconduct, fraud or a knowing viola-
tion of law.28 
In 2003, Nevada followed through on its plan to bolster revenue by 
raising its maximum annual franchise tax from $85 to $11,100. These 
changes combine with Nevada’s 1999 clarification of the business judg-
                                                                                                             
 24. Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Law as a ByProduct: Theories of Private Law 
Production (Ill. Program in Law, Behavior & Soc. Science Paper No. LBSS11-27, 2011), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1884985. 
 25. See Barzuza, supra note 20. 
 26. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.138(7) (2011). 
 27. Id. § 78.138(1). 
 28. Id. § 78.138(7). 
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ment rule’s application to takeover defenses that do not restrict share-
holders’ voting rights.29 
In order to assess Nevada’s role in the national market for corporate 
law, it is necessary to compare Nevada with the leading competitor in 
that market. Delaware default rules provide for the standard director fi-
duciary duties of care and loyalty.30 Most publicly held Delaware corpo-
rations, however, have taken advantage of a provision that allows a cor-
poration to include in its articles of incorporation: 
A provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a direc-
tor to the corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for 
breach of fiduciary duty as a director, provided that such provision 
shall not eliminate or limit the liability of a director: (i) For any 
breach of the director’s duty of loyalty to the corporation or its 
stockholders; (ii) for acts or omissions not in good faith or which 
involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law; (iii) 
under § 174 of this title; or (iv) for any transaction from which the 
director derived an improper personal benefit.31 
On the revenue side, Delaware provides for taxes of $75 to $180,000.32 
It is important to emphasize that the difference between Nevada law 
and Delaware law is not as stark as it might appear.33 As noted above, the 
Nevada statute does impose a default fiduciary duty to act in good faith. 
The Nevada Supreme Court explicitly recognized this duty in 2006 in a 
case involving demand excuse in a shareholder derivative suit.34 The 
court cited Delaware law throughout the opinion.35 
The key difference between Delaware law and Nevada law lies in 
the standard for imposing liability for breach of the standard fiduciary 
duty. Under Nevada law, directors are liable only for a breach of fiduci-
ary duty that involves “intentional misconduct, fraud or a knowing viola-
tion of law.”36 A conflict of interest transaction would breach Nevada’s 
                                                 
 29. Id. § 78.139. The business judgment rule operates to give wide discretion to directors by 
insulating their decisions from liability as long as the director rationally believed that the decision 
was in the corporation’s best interests. See generally PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: 
ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01(c)(3) (1994); Larry E. Ribstein & Kelli A. Alces, Direc-
tors’ Duties in Failing Firms, 1 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 529, 532–33 (2006). 
 30. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (West 2011). 
 31. Id. § 102(b)(7). 
 32. How to Calculate Franchise Taxes, STATE OF DEL., http://corp.delaware.gov/frtaxcalc.s 
html (last visited Apr. 14, 2012). 
 33. Indeed, other states also feature fiduciary duties that are more “lax” than Delaware. See, 
e.g., Laurence V. Parker, Jr., Virginia is for Lovers and Directors: Important Differences Between 
Fiduciary Duties in Virginia and Delaware, 2 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 51, 58 (2011). 
 34. Shoen v. SAC Holding Corp., 137 P.3d 1171 (Nev. 2006). 
 35. Id. 
 36. NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.138(7) (2011). 
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default fiduciary standard. It arguably follows that a deliberate breach of 
this duty would constitute intentional misconduct or an act not in good 
faith; therefore, the breach would fall outside Nevada’s exculpatory pro-
vision. Under Delaware law, corporations that opt out under section 
102(b)(7) are liable not only for intentional misconduct, knowing viola-
tion of law, or improper personal benefit—all of which are arguably ac-
tionable in Nevada—but also for breach of the duty of loyalty or acts or 
omissions that are not in good faith.37 These categories may involve con-
duct that is neither selfish nor intentionally wrongful, bordering on con-
duct protected by the business judgment rule. 
The difference between Nevada law and Delaware law is highlight-
ed by the Delaware Supreme Court’s opinion in Stone v. Ritter,38 which 
held that a board’s conscious failure to adopt a compliance program in 
the face of a known duty to act may constitute a breach of good faith that 
survives a charter limitation on the board’s duty of care.39 It is unlikely 
that such a claim would survive dismissal in Nevada because, assuming 
Nevada law does not mandate a compliance program, managers’ failure 
to adopt such a program may not amount to intentional misconduct. 
Moreover, Nevada does not have an open-ended bad faith exception that 
could catch this conduct like in Delaware. In other words, the key differ-
ence between Nevada and Delaware is not that Nevada managers have 
no liability for wrongdoing, but that they are liable only when they know 
they are engaging in wrongdoing. 
Apart from the precise standard of liability in Nevada, the relevant 
empirical question to ask in order to determine whether Nevada is facili-
tating a race to the bottom is whether firms’ opportunity to incorporate 
under Nevada law injures shareholders. This question is deceivingly 
complex. It is not enough that Nevada offers its managers a greater op-
portunity to cheat than other states’ laws. As discussed below in Part III, 
shareholders might reasonably trade higher cheating costs for lower costs 
of controlling cheating. Nor is Nevada law necessarily a problem if it 
raises the cost of capital for Nevada firms compared to that of compara-
ble firms incorporated under other states’ laws. If this were the case, 
post-incorporation shareholders would not be harmed because they 
would pay a lower price for their shares to reflect the possibility of man-
agerial cheating. 
The main concern here is for existing shareholders who have been 
harmed by their managers’ decision to reincorporate in Nevada, perhaps 
because they were misled by faulty proxy disclosures. At that point the 
                                                 
 37. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (West 2011). 
 38. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006). 
 39. Id. at 367. 
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shareholders may be stuck with the choice of living with higher agency 
costs, selling out for the lower price caused by the reincorporation, or 
incurring the substantial expense of removing the managers or otherwise 
forcing a move out of Nevada. Nevada’s corporate law can contribute to 
the risk of poor governance by offering managers an opportunity to es-
cape monitoring that would not exist in other states.40 
It is difficult to definitively determine whether a particular state’s 
corporate law provision reduces shareholder welfare in the context of a 
generally competitive market for corporate law. If shareholders generally 
are getting what they pay for, offering investors an additional governance 
choice may be worth the risk to shareholders who are injured by transi-
tion to the new law. But there may be a point at which a state’s corporate 
law offers so little potential benefit to the overall market that it is not 
worth the risk of injury to some shareholders. Part III addresses this con-
cern by considering Nevada’s potential contribution to the overall market 
for corporate law. This analysis is important in determining whether the 
Nevada statute supports imposing federal minimum standards or other 
regulation. 
III. EFFICIENT MARKET SEGMENTATION 
Part II presents the worst case for Nevada—it provides a refuge for 
inefficiently lax governance. This Part discusses an alternative or addi-
tional perspective on Nevada law—it provides a mechanism for reducing 
agency costs. Nevada law reduces agency costs by tailoring managers’ 
fiduciary duties to fit both the type of firm that chooses Nevada law and 
the Nevada courts’ institutional capacity to judge whether corporate 
agents have met these duties. Policymakers must evaluate both the per-
spective set out in Part II and the alternative perspective set out in this 
Part before deciding the implications of Nevada corporate law for feder-
alizing corporate law. 
A. Agency Costs and State Corporate Law 
An important objective of corporate law is to promote contractual 
provisions that minimize agency costs. This principle is not the same as 
minimizing the amount of cheating by agents. Rather, agency costs are 
better understood as the total costs of owners delegating control over the 
management of property to agents, thereby separating control from own-
ership of the property. These costs include not only losses from agent 
cheating, but also principals and agents’ monitoring and bonding costs of 
                                                 
 40. See infra Part V for an attempt to empirically test the effect of reincorporation on stock 
prices. 
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reducing the risk of loss.41 For example, a principal could reduce agent 
cheating by watching everything the agent does or by reducing the 
agent’s discretion. Nevertheless, this approach could increase total agen-
cy costs because the costs of watching the agent or reducing the value of 
the agent’s exercise of discretion exceed the benefits of reduced cheat-
ing. Agency costs, defined as the costs of hiring an agent, are never zero 
because the incentive problem inherent in separating ownership and con-
trol requires either incurring the costs of controlling cheating or leaving 
the agent free to cheat. At the same time, there may be significant bene-
fits associated with delegating to agents, particularly in situations where 
agency costs are highest—that is, where numerous and dispersed princi-
pals must delegate control to a central authority because of the impossi-
bility of effectively coordinating decision-making. 
In evaluating the efficiency of state corporate law, it is important to 
keep in mind that law is just one of many potential ways principals have 
to reduce agent cheating. State-imposed fiduciary duties involve ex post 
judicial review of fiduciary conduct and judicially enforced damages and 
equitable relief for misconduct. Principals could supplement or substitute 
for these duties, among other things, shareholder approval of agents’ 
acts, incentive compensation to align agents’ incentives with the firm’s 
interests, shareholder transfer or exit rights, and review of agent conduct 
by independent directors, auditors, or lawyers. Principals could also rely 
on market mechanisms such as price signals in product and securities 
markets, markets for corporate control and managerial services, and rep-
utational incentives. Judicially enforced contract provisions, rather than 
default or mandatory rules in state corporate law, could provide some of 
these terms. The federal securities laws provide additional mandatory 
penalties for fraud, nondisclosure, and other misconduct. This helps en-
sure that shareholders have the facts about how well their firms are gov-
erned. Federal law also provides some minimum governance standards 
for publicly held firms.42 In short, the efficiency of state corporate law 
depends on its marginal costs and benefits in controlling agent cheating 
given other constraints on agency costs. 
An additional consideration in assessing state corporate law is that 
firms have differing governance needs. Firms with concentrated share-
holdings or majority or controlling shareholders may have very different 
agency cost control problems from firms with widely dispersed share-
                                                 
 41. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). 
 42. See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 7262 (West 2002); HENRY N. BUTLER & 
LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE SARBANES OXLEY DEBACLE: WHAT WE’VE LEARNED; HOW TO FIX IT 
(2006). 
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holders. Firms may select the rules that fit their needs not only by enter-
ing into customized contracts but also by choosing a suitable organiza-
tional form or state law.43 It follows that state competition may be effi-
cient even if it does not produce a single superior “winner,” but rather a 
mix of laws that is suitable for different types of firms.44 
Nevada law can be further analyzed in terms of error costs. Even if 
fiduciary duties might seem to add a necessary constraint on cheating, 
these duties still may not be efficient in the real world in which human 
judges decide fiduciary duty cases. Lax fiduciary standards could lead to 
“Type II” errors, meaning the standards allow more cheating than the 
shareholders would prefer.45 On the other hand, Nevada law could also 
reduce “Type I” errors by reducing liability that might motivate manag-
ers to engage in acts that do not benefit shareholders such as non-cost-
justified monitoring or avoiding risky but positive net present value busi-
ness decisions.46 
The risk of Type I error is compounded by agency costs in litigating 
fiduciary breaches. Courts must determine, in hindsight, whether busi-
ness judgments that turn out poorly were reasonably made under the cir-
cumstances. The risk of error may be compounded by another set of 
agents, plaintiffs’ lawyers, who can earn fees for bringing marginal cases 
that survive dismissal even if these cases cause net harm to sharehold-
ers.47 Thus, restricting fiduciary duties in order to reduce error costs 
could improve efficiency even when fiduciary duties provide efficient 
discipline in an ideal world. 
B. Nevada’s Strategy 
This section examines Nevada law’s approach to agency costs in 
light of the analysis discussed above. As emphasized in Part II, the key 
difference between Nevada law and Delaware law is that Nevada law 
imposes liability for a breach of fiduciary duty only when the defendant 
                                                 
 43. See RIBSTEIN, supra note 23. 
 44. Id.; see also RICHARD A. POSNER & KENNETH E. SCOTT, ECONOMICS OF CORPORATION 
LAW AND SECURITIES REGULATION (1980); Barry D. Baysinger & Henry N. Butler, The Role of 
Corporate Law in the Theory of the Firm, 28 J.L. & ECON. 179, 179 (1985). 
 45. Type II errors are also known as “false negatives.” In the context of enforcement of a legal 
rule, a Type II error occurs when there is an erroneous finding of no liability, or in the criminal con-
text, when the guilty are allowed to go free. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 
218 (6th ed. 2003). 
 46. Type I errors are also known as “false positives.” In the context of enforcement of a legal 
rule, a Type I error occurs when there is an erroneous finding of liability, or in the criminal context, 
when the innocent are falsely convicted. Id. 
 47. See, e.g., Marilyn F. Johnson, Karen K. Nelson & A. C. Pritchard, Do the Merits Matter 
More? The Impact of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 627 
(2007). 
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knows she is breaching a legal duty. Nevada law thus ensures that Neva-
da courts have a limited ability to second-guess business decisions. Ne-
vada’s intentional misconduct standard alleviates the indeterminacy 
problem that plagues Delaware judges’ attempts to draw fine lines be-
tween business decisions that do and do not warrant special judicial at-
tention.48 This reflects a tradeoff between the benefits of strict discipline 
of fiduciary misconduct and the potential costs of excessive error from 
judicial monitoring.49 
Analysis of Nevada’s competitive strategy must explain not only 
how Nevada’s supposed laxity attracts out-of-state incorporations but 
also how it can maintain its competitive advantage, despite charging 
more for incorporation than any state in the country other than Delaware 
while lacking Delaware’s substantial infrastructure and long-standing 
reputation. The problem for Nevada is that it cannot copyright its law, so 
any state could pass the same law and charge a lower price.50 And unlike 
Delaware, Nevada has no obvious institutional or reputational mecha-
nism to protect it from such price-cutting competition.51 It would seem 
that another state could take over Nevada’s leadership as a Delaware al-
ternative just as swiftly as Delaware took over New Jersey’s spot in the 
early days of the corporate competition in the United States.52 
One explanation for the unique success of Nevada’s strategy is that 
it not only attracts firms by enacting beneficial corporate law, but Neva-
da is also able to credibly bond its promise to refrain from materially 
changing the law after corporations have incurred the costs of incorporat-
ing in the state. Nevada’s dependence on the substantial future revenues 
                                                 
 48. See William J. Carney & George B. Shepherd, The Mystery of Delaware’s Continuing 
Success, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 12−17 (arguing that Delaware law suffers from excessive indeter-
minacy); Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in Corporate Law, 98 
COLUM. L. REV. 1908, 1908 (1998) (arguing that indeterminacy enhances Delaware’s competitive 
position); Macey & Miller, supra note 18, at 503−04 (arguing that the complexity of Delaware law 
serves lawyers’ interests by increasing litigation). 
 49. The point here is not that Nevada law reduces the risk of “frivolous” lawsuits that have a 
low likelihood of liability. See Barzuza, supra note 20, at 37. Rather, it guards against Type I error 
by narrowing the situations in which liability can be imposed to those that can be avoided at a rela-
tively low cost. For a similar explanation of the mens rea requirement in criminal law, see Jeffrey S. 
Parker, The Economics of Mens Rea, 79 VA. L. REV. 741 (1993). 
 50. See Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Law’s Information Revolution, 53 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 1169 (2011) (discussing lack of property rights in law); Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 24  
(same). 
 51. See Larry E. Ribstein, Lawyers as Lawmakers: A Theory of Lawyer Licensing, 69 MO. L. 
REV. 299 (2004). 
 52. See Christopher Grandy, New Jersey Corporate Charter-Mongering, 1875−1929, 49 J. 
ECON. HIST. 677 (1989). 
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generated by its unique law acts as a reputational bond that makes it po-
litically difficult for the legislature to change the standard ex post.53 
There is an additional question of why Nevada chooses to compete 
with Delaware on the low end of monitoring rather than by offering a 
stricter law. One explanation is that Nevada’s bright-line approach to 
liability meshes well with Nevada’s legal infrastructure of judges and 
lawyers. Delaware corporate judges are adept at writing extensive opin-
ions, sometimes on a tight schedule that analyze corporate transactions 
with care and expertise. These decisions must distinguish between ac-
ceptable business judgment at the time of the decision and a violation of 
the applicable legal standards in the particular case. Judges also must 
prescribe governance practices that are both realistic and effective and fit 
the case into the complex network of existing Delaware law. In order to 
do their job, even the most expert judges rely on comparably expert ad-
vocates to navigate this process. Indeed, Delaware judges are drawn from 
the ranks of the Delaware bar. By contrast, Nevada, like other states 
aside from Delaware, lacks a comparable corporate law infrastructure 
and is unlikely to acquire such an infrastructure without either first at-
tracting the high-end incorporation business or making a substantial in-
vestment in infrastructure on the gamble that the business will come. 
Delaware faces the converse problem from Nevada. Because Dela-
ware has invested in a high-level infrastructure, it can maintain its com-
petitive advantage only by applying legal rules that use this infrastruc-
ture. If Delaware were to imitate Nevada’s bright-line approach, it would 
effectively devalue its costly infrastructure and sacrifice its main compet-
itive advantage. In other words, Nevada and Delaware are essentially in 
two distinct businesses—low infrastructure coupled with bright-line rules 
versus high infrastructure coupled with flexible standards of corporate 
law. 
There are many other states that lack Delaware’s infrastructure that 
could enact corporate law provisions similar to Nevada and generate sim-
ilar assurances against change; Nevada, however, has two unique charac-
teristics that complement its low-monitoring strategy and thereby enable 
it to out-compete other states. First, Nevada’s ability to provide assur-
ance that it will not change its laws is supported by its relatively sparse 
population. This makes it more dependent on incorporation fees than 
more populous states. Second, Nevada can successfully compete against 
other small states because its general reputation, based on a large and 
successful gambling industry, reduces the likelihood of political backlash 
                                                 
 53. See Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractu-
al Performance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615 (1981). 
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based on public concern that lax corporate law will cast the state in a bad 
light. 
Nevada’s strategy also has implications for the types of firms for 
which Nevada could be expected to compete. In general, firms could be 
expected to choose Delaware law if they want to offer investors strong 
assurances that they are making substantial investments in monitoring. 
Consistent with our agency cost analysis above, firms would select Del-
aware when the marginal benefits exceed the marginal costs of such ad-
ditional monitoring. Two characteristics of Nevada firms are consistent 
with a demand for lower levels of monitoring. First, Nevada public firms 
are smaller than those in Delaware. This characteristic alone increases 
the per capitalization cost of establishing controls to catch accounting 
errors. Indeed, small size is one of the factors generally associated with 
weaker controls.54 Second, Nevada has a relatively high percentage of 
family firms.55 Such firms are generally directly controlled by their 
shareholders and therefore need not rely on auditors and disclosure to 
discipline managers. John Coffee attributes the presence of fewer ac-
counting scandals in Europe than in the United States following the 2001 
stock market crash to basic differences between European and U.S. firms 
with respect to shareholder concentration.56 U.S.-style dispersed share-
holder firms are more likely to rely on option compensation, which in-
creases the risk of revenue-recognition problems.57 The relatively high 
percentage of family firms in Nevada suggests that Nevada firms are 
more like those in Europe than those incorporated in Delaware. 
C. Choice of Form 
Section B discusses reasons why Nevada is able to secure a position 
as a key competitor to Delaware in the market for corporate law. But an 
alternative scenario is competition in the market for noncorporate busi-
ness forms. Indeed, Delaware is already competing successfully by offer-
ing uncorporate (limited partnership and LLC) law that is laxer than Ne-
vada corporate law, in addition to access to Delaware’s superior infra-
structure,58 all at a significantly lower price than both Nevada and Dela-
                                                 
 54. See Jeffrey T. Doyle, Weili Ge & Sarah E. McVay, Determinants of Weaknesses in Inter-
nal Control over Financial Reporting, 44 J. ACCT. & ECON. 193, 193−94 (2007). 
 55. See Barzuza, supra note 20, at 41. 
 56. John C. Coffee, Jr., A Theory of Corporate Scandals: Why the U.S. and Europe Differ, 21 
OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 198 (2005). 
 57. See id. 
 58. See Larry E. Ribstein, The Uncorporation and Corporate Indeterminacy, 2009 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 131, 133. 
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ware corporate law.59 The uncorporate alternative provides further sup-
port for the proposition that the Nevada phenomenon is not simply a 
competition over laxity, but rather a more nuanced competition over the 
nature of agency cost control and the role of legal infrastructure. 
Delaware’s limited partnership and LLC statutes provide for near 
complete opt-out from all fiduciary duties, comparable to the freedom 
under the Nevada corporate statute. For example, Delaware’s limited 
partnership statute provides: 
(d) To the extent that, at law or in equity, a partner or other person 
has duties (including fiduciary duties) to a limited partnership or to 
another partner or to another person that is a party to or is otherwise 
bound by a partnership agreement, the partner’s or other person’s 
duties may be expanded or restricted or eliminated by provisions in 
the partnership agreement; provided that the partnership agreement 
may not eliminate the implied contractual covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing. 
(e) Unless otherwise provided in a partnership agreement, a partner 
or other person shall not be liable to a limited partnership or to an-
other partner or to another person that is a party to or is otherwise 
bound by a partnership agreement for breach of fiduciary duty for 
the partner’s or other person’s good faith reliance on the provisions 
of the partnership agreement. 
(f) A partnership agreement may provide for the limitation or elimi-
nation of any and all liabilities for breach of contract and breach of 
duties (including fiduciary duties) of a partner or other person to a 
limited partnership or to another partner or to another person that is 
a party to or is otherwise bound by a partnership agreement; provid-
ed that a partnership agreement may not limit or eliminate liability 
for any act or omission that constitutes a bad faith violation of the 
implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing.60 
Notably, the Delaware uncorporate statutes, unlike both Nevada and 
Delaware corporate law, provide for complete waiver of fiduciary duties, 
leaving only the implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing. Delaware’s courts have confirmed that these statutes do indeed al-
low complete waiver of default fiduciary duties, leaving only a contrac-
tual duty that is defined with reference to the parties’ contracts.61 These 
                                                 
 59. Mohsen Manesh, Delaware and the Market for LLC Law: A Theory of Contractibility and 
Legal Indeterminacy, 52 B.C. L. REV. 189, 191, 198−209 (2011) (discussing the implications of the 
different pricing of Delaware corporations and uncorporations). 
 60. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-1101 (West 2010) (applying to LPs). A similar provision 
applies to LLCs. See id. § 18-1101. 
 61. See Ribstein, supra note 58, at 143. 
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features of Delaware uncorporations come at a much lower price than 
either Nevada or Delaware incorporation.62 
Delaware uncorporate law provides additional insights into state 
competition for business association law in general and Nevada corpora-
tion law in particular. As noted above, a key difference between Dela-
ware and other states with regard to both corporate and uncorporate law 
is legal infrastructure. Delaware uncorporate law demands a substantial 
infrastructure for interpreting agreements that dispense with the rich 
background of fiduciary duties.63 The Delaware uncorporate alternative 
also raises the question of why firms need to go to Nevada to opt out of 
liability for unintentional breach of fiduciary duty when they can com-
pletely avoid fiduciary duties through Delaware uncorporate law.64 The 
wide availability of lax corporation and uncorporation law in jurisdic-
tions other than Nevada supports the above explanation of Nevada law 
based on error costs rather than laxity.65 
IV. DID NEVADA ATTRACT MISCREANTS? EVIDENCE 
FROM RESTATEMENTS 
Part III shows that the Nevada statute can be explained as a way to 
reasonably economize on agency costs rather than more simplistically as 
a platform for managers to cheat shareholders. But this benign explana-
tion for Nevada law does not eliminate the possibility that—whatever its 
strategy—Nevada is in fact a haven for cheaters and therefore contributes 
to a race to the bottom in the market for corporate law. Part IV addresses 
this argument by analyzing the evidence regarding the types of firms that 
are incorporating in Nevada. 
                                                 
 62. See Manesh, supra note 59. 
 63. For an analysis of these cases, see Ribstein, supra note 58, at 143−61. Indeed, this indeter-
minacy could be as much a problem for uncorporations as for corporations. See id. at 165–66. This 
has prompted Delaware’s Chief Justice Steele to suggest that Delaware should dispense with default 
fiduciary duties, a change that would move Delaware uncorporate law even beyond Nevada corpo-
rate law in laxity. Myron Steele, Freedom of Contract and Default Contractual Duties in the Dela-
ware Limited Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies, 46 AM. BUS. L.J. 221, 238−41 (2009); 
see also Larry E. Ribstein, Should There Be Default Fiduciary Duties in Delaware LLCs and LPs?, 
TRUTH ON THE MARKET (Dec. 9, 2011), http://truthonthemarket.com/2011/12/09/should-there-be-
default-fiduciary-duties-in-delaware-llcs-and-lps/. 
 64. In fact, shedding fiduciary duties makes more sense for uncorporations, which trade these 
duties for other agency cost control mechanisms, particularly including exit and high-powered man-
agerial incentives. See generally RIBSTEIN, supra note 23. 
 65. Delaware’s embrace of open-ended contracting for fiduciary duties raises doubts about 
Barzuza’s argument that Delaware would hesitate to compete with Nevada for laxity in corporate 
law for fear of diluting its brand or increasing the possibility of federal regulation. See Barzuza, 
supra note 20, at 25–28. 
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Barzuza and Smith approach this determination by using firms’ ac-
counting restatements as a proxy for bad governance.66 They find that 
firms incorporated in Nevada between 2000 and 2008, mostly after Ne-
vada changed its law, have a 40% higher likelihood of issuing a restate-
ment than those incorporated in Delaware and other states during this 
period after controlling for various firm-level characteristics. They note 
that accounting restatements involve an admission by the firm that its 
previous accounting was materially inaccurate, as shown by data indicat-
ing a strong negative market reaction to restatement issuance.67 Barzuza 
and Barzuza and Smith also cite data that they argue support the link be-
tween restatements and lax governance.68 
Note that Barzuza does not claim that Nevada law causes or even 
permits more accounting restatements.69 Indeed, Barzuza and Smith 
found no evidence of increased restatements following reincorporation 
under Nevada’s lax provisions.70 But Nevada corporations’ higher likeli-
hood of restatements may indicate that Nevada’s lax law attracts poorly 
governed firms. On the other hand, as emphasized throughout this Arti-
cle, a higher probability of an accounting restatement may simply reflect 
a rational corporate decision to reduce overall agency costs by investing 
fewer resources in monitoring.71 The question then is whether Nevada 
firms’ high level of restatements indicates that they are poorly governed 
not simply because they optimally invest less in monitoring than other 
firms, but because they choose a level of monitoring that decreases firm 
value. This depends on the type of restatements prevalent among Nevada 
                                                 
 66. See Barzuza & Smith, supra note 20. Firms file restated financial statements to correct 
errors in the statements previously submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). See 
Kristen L. Anderson & Teri Lombardi Yohn, The Effect of 10K Restatements on Firm Value, In-
formation Asymmetries, and Investors’ Reliance on Earnings (Sept. 2002) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=332380. 
 67. Anderson & Yohn, supra note 66; Coffee, supra note 56. 
 68. William R. Baber et al., Shareholder Rights, Corporate Governance and Accounting Re-
statement, (Feb. 1, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers 
.cfm?abstract_id=760324 (noting restating firms have less exposure to the market for control and 
shareholder discipline); Jap Efendi, Anup Srivastava & Edward P. Swanson, Why Do Corporate 
Managers Misstate Financial Statements? The Role of Option Compensation and Other Factors, 85 
J. FIN. ECON. 667 (2007) (link between restatements and CEO in-the-money stock options); Michael 
Ettredge et al., How Do Restatements Begin? Evidence of Earnings Management Preceding Restated 
Financial Reports, 37 J. BUS. FIN. & ACCT. 332 (2010) (restatements tend to reflect balance sheet 
bloating); see Simi Kedia & Thomas Philippon, The Economics of Fraudulent Accounting, 22 REV. 
FIN. STUD. 2169 (2009) (linking restatements and worse governance as reflected by governance 
indices). 
 69. See Barzuza & Smith, supra note 20, at 21–22 (discussing regressions in Table 8 that in-
clude firm-level fixed effects). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Indeed, they find that Nevada firms are much less likely to use Big 4 audit firms at the time 
of the restatement and generally rely on smaller, regional accounting firms. Id. at tbl.4. 
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firms and the connection between these restatements and firm govern-
ance. 
For several reasons, the Nevada restatements noted by Barzuza and 
Smith do not necessarily indicate a high prevalence of fraud, as distin-
guished from mistakes that could result from a decision not to invest in 
stringent monitoring. First, the raw data indicate that while Nevada firms 
are about 60% more likely than other states to require restatements, they 
are only marginally more likely than Delaware firms to involve fraud 
allegations or an investigation by regulators (1.3% versus 1.2%).72 This 
is not surprising given that federal law primarily disciplines accounting 
fraud. 
Second, even the restatements accompanied by fraud allegations 
may not indicate excessively low monitoring that would result in reduc-
tions in firm value. Alleging accounting restatements has become a sig-
nificant way to escape dismissal in the wake of the higher pleading 
standards under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA).73 
Because such cases are much more likely to be filed, some of the filed 
cases alleging fraud will be Type I errors. The PSLRA’s heightened 
pleading requirement therefore may tend to exaggerate restatements’ as-
sociation with fraud allegations in the post-PSLRA data used by Barzuza 
and Smith. 
Third, the data do not indicate that Nevada restatements are the 
types of restatements particularly associated with fraud. Nevada firms 
lost less income as a result of restatements than firms in other states, in-
cluding Delaware,74 suggesting that Nevada firms with bad accounting 
are less prone to inflating income than firms with bad accounting in other 
states. Revenue recognition in particular has been most directly associat-
ed with poor controls.75 Barzuza and Smith’s random sample of restate-
ments76 indicates a variety of problems that do not point to a particular 
propensity for fraud. Indeed, Barzuza notes, “We found that no one type 
of restatements dominates Nevada companies in a way that could explain 
the frequencies of such restatements.”77 The summary reveals accounting 
errors that, for example, “do not reflect a net gain or benefit from certain 
                                                 
 72. Id. at tbl.3, panel A. Note, however, that there is a positive and significant Nevada effect on 
fraud allegations in the regressions. See id. at tbl.6, panel C. 
 73. See Stephen J. Choi, Karen K. Nelson & A. C. Pritchard, The Screening Effect of the Pri-
vate Securities Litigation Reform Act, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 35 (2009); Johnson, Nelson & 
Pritchard, supra note 47. 
 74. See Michal Barzuza & David C. Smith, What Happens in Nevada? Self-Selecting into Lax 
Law, at tbl.3, panel B (October 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
 75. See Anderson & Yohn, supra note 66; Coffee, supra note 56. 
 76. See Barzuza & Smith, supra note 20, at app. tbl.A3. 
 77. Barzuza, supra note 20, at n.156. 
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embedded derivative securities”; “did not affect the Company’s earnings 
or net worth”; “[reflect] an adjustment of $79,750 which had been erro-
neously included in paid-up capital rather than shareholder loans”; and 
“inadvertently failed to record the appropriate expense for such Options 
in accordance with FAS 123(R).”78 
Fourth, the association between Nevada incorporation and restate-
ments may be consistent with firms selecting Nevada because they incur 
high costs or derive lower benefits from monitoring. For example, Neva-
da firms may be more volatile than other types of firms. Volatility has 
been found to be a stronger predictor than size of internal controls weak-
ness.79 Volatile firms are inherently subject to more influences on earn-
ings variation and therefore may have to invest more in monitoring and 
accounting controls to avoid restatements. A high propensity for restate-
ments in these firms therefore may reflect economizing on monitoring 
rather than a likelihood of fraud. 
Fifth, Barzuza’s emphasis on accounting restatements assumes a 
link between restatements and weak governance. This assumption argua-
bly supports the inference that managers of weakly governed firms use 
their power to incorporate in Nevada in order to take advantage of weak 
ex post judicial scrutiny of their conduct. Indeed, stronger external gov-
ernance, such as takeover discipline, has been associated with fewer ac-
counting restatements.80 Barzuza and Smith, however, find that Nevada 
firms actually do not have worse governance than firms incorporated in 
other states as shown by the “G” and “E” governance indices.81 In Neva-
da, the lack of a correlation between governance indices and restatements 
is consistent with other data showing that governance is no more than 
weakly related to accounting restatements.82 This lack of correlation, in 
turn, counters the suggestion that the prevalence of restatements in Ne-
vada indicates that poorly governed firms are flocking to the state. 
V. EFFECT OF NEVADA INCORPORATION ON FIRM VALUE 
The price investors are willing to pay for Nevada corporations is 
the ultimate test of whether there is a problem with Nevada law. The val-
                                                 
 78. Id. 
 79. See Cindy R. Alexander & Kathleen Weiss Hanley, Regulatory Monitoring Under the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Oct. 2, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
1022161. 
 80. See Baber et al., supra note 68. 
 81. See Barzuza & Smith, supra note 20, at tbl.5. The E index, which includes antitakeover 
defenses, is lower in Nevada than in Delaware or the average of states other than Nevada or Dela-
ware. The Nevada G index is higher. 
 82. See David F. Larcker, Scott A. Richardson & Irem Tuna, Corporate Governance, Account-
ing Outcomes, and Organizational Performance, 83 ACCT. REV. 963 (2007). 
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ue of Nevada firms compared to comparable firms incorporated else-
where could indicate the market’s evaluation of Nevada law’s tradeoff 
between costs and benefits of monitoring. 
Barzuza and Smith show that Nevada corporations do not have a 
lower Tobin’s Q than those incorporated in states other than Delaware or 
Nevada, although Nevada incorporation has a less favorable effect on 
Tobin’s Q than Delaware incorporation, which is associated with in-
creased value.83 Barzuza recognizes, however, that Tobin’s Q may be an 
unreliable reflection of shareholder value, particularly in small firms.84 
Moreover, Nevada firms’ Tobin’s Q may reflect characteristics not con-
trolled for in the regressions rather than the effect of Nevada incorpora-
tion. 
The most direct evidence of what Nevada law adds or subtracts 
from the value of firms incorporated there would be an event study 
showing shareholders’ reactions to a publicly held firm’s decision to re-
incorporate to Nevada from some other state.85 But data that would allow 
one to examine the stock price effects of Nevada reincorporations are 
sparse. Our research disclosed few publicly held corporations that rein-
corporated from another state to Nevada after 2001 for which there was 
sufficient event and stock price data to enable such an event study.86 
While the lack of data limits the general inferences that can be made,87 
we present data from one firm, Dynacq Healthcare (Dynacq), to illustrate 
the potential costs and benefits of alternative approaches to the reduction 
of total agency costs discussed in Part III above and to highlight the need 
for better and more complete data on small firms. 
Indeed, apart from its potentially limited use as the basis for a sta-
tistical study, Dynacq’s corporate history usefully illustrates some of the 
costs facing a small firm incorporated in Delaware, as well as the prob-
lems of inferring that Nevada law is suboptimally lax. Dynacq initially 
                                                 
 83. See Barzuza & Smith, supra note 20, at tbl.11. Tobin’s Q equals the ratio of the market 
value of a firm’s assets to the book value of a firm’s assets and is used as a measure of financial 
performance. Id. at 14. 
 84. See Barzuza, supra note 20, at 46. 
 85. See Romano, supra note 14. 
 86. We began with a list of 319 firms that had reincorporated to Nevada after its 2001 corpo-
rate law revisions. Dynacq Healthcare was the only firm in which stock price data and specific event 
data, including the board meeting date on which the decision to reincorporate was made, was simul-
taneously available. 
 87. The lack of a substantial number of firms with usable data would raise questions regarding 
the external validity of any results obtained from a statistical study of the abnormal returns around 
the announcement of the firm’s decision to reincorporate to Nevada (i.e., the ability to generalize any 
results obtained). See Jonathan Klick & Robert H. Sitkoff, Agency Costs, Charitable Trusts, and 
Corporate Control: Evidence from Hershey’s Kiss-Off, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 786 (2008) (dis-
cussing these issues in the context of a single firm event study). There are also issues with respect to 
the internal validity of any results that are discussed infra in note 91. 
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incorporated under the laws of Nevada. Thus, the firm began with the 
low-cost and low-infrastructure Nevada strategy. In 2003, the firm rein-
corporated under Delaware law and hired a “big four” accounting firm 
(Ernst & Young). The firm’s transition to the higher-cost and high-
infrastructure Delaware strategy did not go smoothly. The move exposed 
Dynacq’s low levels of internal controls. Soon after reincorporating in 
Delaware, the company was forced to delay the filing of its quarterly and 
annual reports. Ernst & Young resigned as its auditor, and Dynacq was 
forced to restate its earnings for the years 1999 through 2002.88 Delisting 
from NASDAQ and a round of class action lawsuits followed.89 
While the move to Delaware and the hiring of a big four accounting 
firm exposed Dynacq’s low level of internal controls and forced it to re-
state its earnings, this does not necessarily imply that its initial choice of 
Nevada law or its low level of internal controls was suboptimal. Indeed, 
the firm subsequently reversed its 2003 decision to reincorporate under 
Delaware law by reincorporating under Nevada law in 2006.90 
This 2006 decision offers a potential opportunity to test between the 
two accounts of Nevada law presented in Parts II and III. It allows us to 
                                                 
 88. The Dynacq restatements are similar to those discussed supra in the text accompanying 
notes 75 and 76. Specifically, none of the restatements resulted in reductions in reported net revenue, 
cash flows from operating activities, or stockholders’ equity. See Press Release, Dynacq Healthcare, 
Inc., Dynacq Healthcare, Inc. Announces Changes in Previously Reported Financial Results and 
Provides Litigation Update (July 14, 2004), available at http://www.dynacq.com/NewsItem.cfm 
?ItemID=23. 
 89. These suits were the second set of class action lawsuits filed against Dynacq and resulted in 
a settlement in 2007 for 1.5 million dollars, an amount that included the payment to the class, as well 
as all administrative costs and attorneys’ fees. These suits are summarized at Stanford Law School 
Securities Class Action Clearinghouse, DYNACQ HEALTHCARE, INC., http://securities.stanford.edu/ 
1029/DYIIE03-01/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2012). The prior set of class action lawsuits occurred in 
2002 during the firm’s first incorporation in Nevada. The lawsuit was dismissed in 2003 prior to 
Dynacq’s reincorporation to Delaware. These suits are summarized at id., http://securities.stan 
ford.edu/1023/DYII02-01/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2012). 
 90. In its proxy statement, Dynacq states the “principal reason for reincorporation from Dela-
ware to Nevada is to eliminate our obligation to pay the annual Delaware franchise tax which will 
result in significant savings to us in the future.” The proxy statement also notes that a 
potential disadvantage of reincorporating from Delaware to Nevada is that Delaware for 
many years has followed a policy of encouraging incorporation in that state and, in fur-
therance of that policy, has adopted comprehensive, modern and flexible corporate laws 
that Delaware periodically updates and revises to meet changing business needs. Because 
of Delaware’s prominence as a state of incorporation for many large corporations, the 
Delaware courts have developed considerable expertise in dealing with corporate issues 
and a substantial body of case law has developed construing Delaware law and establish-
ing public policies with respect to Delaware corporations. By reincorporating in Nevada, 
we may experience less predictability with respect to management of our corporate af-
fairs. 
Proxy Statement Pursuant to Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, DYNACQ 
HEALTHCARE, INC., available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/890908/00011931250626 
1075/ddef14a.htm. 
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perform a single firm event study based on the firm’s stock price reaction 
to its decision to reincorporate under Nevada law. With a null hypothesis 
that shareholders were unaffected by the decision to reincorporate to Ne-
vada, the two accounts of Nevada law yield two alternative hypotheses. 
The first is that the Nevada reincorporation is the result of the firm man-
agers’ self-serving decision to move to a jurisdiction with lax controls. 
Under this race-to-the-bottom hypothesis, the announcement of the deci-
sion to reincorporate from Delaware to Nevada should result in negative 
abnormal returns to shareholders. The second alternative hypothesis is 
that the decision to reincorporate reflects the managers’ choice to move 
to a lower cost jurisdiction in order to minimize overall monitoring costs. 
Under this hypothesis, the reincorporation announcement should result in 
positive abnormal returns to shareholders. 
Figure 1 shows the abnormal returns surrounding the board’s 2006 
decision to reincorporate in Nevada. We could not reject the null hypoth-
esis that shareholders were unaffected by the decision to reincorporate, 
as there is no evidence of statistically significant negative or positive ab-
normal returns generated by the announcement of the firm’s decision to 
reincorporate under Nevada law.91 Specifically, using a two-tailed non-
parametric SQ test with a standard .05 significance level, there are no 
statistically significant abnormal returns on or around the proxy mailing 
date or the date the shareholders approved the move back to Nevada.92 
                                                 
 91. Event studies based on small numbers of firms pose special problems resulting from the 
greater volatility experienced by a portfolio of a small number of firms and the fact that the assump-
tion of normally distributed abnormal returns assumed in conventional hypothesis testing may not 
approximate the actual distribution of returns. See Klick & Sitkoff, supra note 87, at 810. These 
problems are exacerbated when looking at a portfolio made up of a single small firm. Indeed, a plot 
of the abnormal return from the estimation period of the Dynacq market model indicates these re-
turns were not normally distributed. In the statistical tests reported in this Article, we used a nonpar-
ametric SQ test to adjust for the possibility of abnormally distributed abnormal returns. For a discus-
sion of this test and its use in single firm event studies, see Jonah B. Gelbach, Eric Helland & Jona-
than Klick, Valid Inference in Single-Firm, Single-Event Studies (Jan. 6, 2011) (unpublished manu-
script), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1442222. 
 92. Given the two alternative hypotheses, using a two-tailed test is appropriate. Our nonfinding 
with respect to the existence of statistically significant abnormal returns and the high volatility asso-
ciated with our portfolio of a single small firm do generate concerns regarding the potentially limited 
power of our test (the inability of our statistical test to correctly reject the null hypothesis of no effect 
when the alternative hypothesis that Nevada reincorporation harms shareholders is true). For a gen-
eral discussion of these issues, see STEVEN T. ZILIAK & DEIRDRE N. MCCLOSKEY, THE CULT OF 
STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE: HOW THE STANDARD ERROR COSTS JOBS, JUSTICE, AND LIVES (2007); 
Deirdre N. McCloskey & Stephen T. Ziliak, The Standard Error of Regressions, 34 J. ECON. 
LITERATURE 97 (1996). For example, our test would not detect a 13% negative abnormal return that 
was caused by Dynacq’s decision to reincorporate under Nevada law. Increasing the significance 
level can increase the power of our test. Indeed, there is a single 10.34% negative abnormal return on 
the date of board meeting where the decision to reincorporate back to Nevada was made that is sta-
tistically significant if a .10 significance level is used. But there is reason to question whether this 
large magnitude negative abnormal return signals the market’s reaction to the decision to reincorpo-
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Figure 1 – Dynacq Healthcare (DYII) Abnormal Returns 
 
Thus, while the single firm event study gives us a limited oppor-
tunity to test shareholder reaction to Nevada versus Delaware incorpora-
tion, the results obtained fail to provide evidence that would clarify this 
issue.93 The most that we can say at this time is that there is a general 
absence of direct stock price evidence regarding the validity of a Nevada 
race-to-the-bottom theory. 
VI. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
The 2001 Nevada corporate law amendments reignited the specter 
of a race to the bottom in corporate law raised by Cary and suggested a 
need for federal corporation law advocated by Cary and Berle and 
Means. But we have provided a benign explanation for Nevada law that 
emphasizes a firm’s decision to reduce agency costs by choosing cost-
effective mechanisms for monitoring agents. Rather than supporting fed-
eralization, Nevada corporation law indicates the depth and complexity 
                                                                                                             
rate to Nevada. Specifically, this date precedes the public disclosure date, and there is no evidence of 
any insider selling on or around the date of the board meeting. 
 93. In addition, we performed an event study examining Dynacq Healthcare’s earlier 2003 
decision to reincorporate from Nevada to Delaware. We find no evidence of significant positive 
abnormal returns generated by announcement of the firm’s decision to reincorporate from Nevada to 
Delaware. 
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of the state law market for monitoring and therefore an important cost of 
one-size-fits-all devices for controlling agency costs. 
Data on the causes and effects of Nevada incorporation could 
change this conclusion; the data so far, however, are sparse and incon-
clusive. This raises the question of the appropriate burden of proof in 
problems related to state law that could warrant federal control. Even if 
some evidence were to indicate that Nevada was providing a refuge for 
inefficiently governed firms, it is not clear that this would justify outlaw-
ing experimentation in the market for state law. Problems with a first-
mover state like Nevada are likely to be sufficiently salient that share-
holders in Nevada corporations know what they are getting. As long as 
the market applies an appropriate discount, there is room for Nevada-
type experimentation. 
All of this is not to say that the market for corporate law functions 
perfectly. In particular, it is still not clear why there are only two compet-
itors in this market, why one of these competitors is dominant, and why 
there is not more diversity in state corporate law. We have elsewhere 
suggested that the problem may lie in government legislators’ weak in-
centives to innovate and the limited and skewed incentives for private 
parties’ participation in the market for business association standard 
forms.94 If private actors had stronger property rights in law, they might 
have an incentive to create a variety of different standard forms that 
states could adopt. There might then be more alternative standard forms 
and more variations on each standard form. 
In general, the market is still learning about what does and does not 
work in corporate governance. Just as Berle and Means’s warning of the 
dangers of separating ownership and control have given rise to a large 
literature that demonstrates the offsetting benefits of this separation and 
how the dangers that result can be addressed, so too has Cary’s warning 
about Delaware’s race to the bottom spawned theories and evidence con-
cerning the benefits of the market for corporate law. We should now be 
skeptical about substituting Nevada for Delaware as the new “bottom,” 
and we should wait for more evidence that Nevada represents a systemat-
ic problem before attempting to regulate it. 
 
                                                 
 94. See Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 24. 
